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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN ROLFE GASSMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver
license Division, Department of Public Safety,
Defendant-Appellant.

CteeNo.
13849

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license
revocation by the appelant under Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as
amended.
DISPOSITION BELOW
On January 2§, 1974, the appellant revoked the raspondent's license to drive for the latter's aleged failure
to submit to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. § 41Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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6-44.10 (1953), as amended, said revocation to be for one
year commending January 3, 1974. Pursuant to the provisions of said act, respondent through his attorney,
sought a trial de novo in the District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, filed on the 25th day of February,
1974, and obtained from Third District Judge Stewart
M. Hanson, a stay on the revocation pending the hearing
de novo, on the question of whether respondent's license
was subject to revocation. The case was heard before
the Honorable Jay E. Banks on June 19, 1974. Judge
Banks found that resipondent did not unreasonably refuse to suibmit to a sobriety test but did in feet request
a blood alcohol test. Consequently, Judge Banks ruled
that the petition of the respondent to set aside the revocation under administrative hearing be granted, and that
the respondent be ordered reinstated to his driving privileges as if the same had never been revoked, and that
any and all references to said revocation from respondent's driving record be deleted by appellant. This order
of Third District Judge Jay E. Banks was entered and
filed of record on September 5, 1974.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
of September 5, 1974, ordering the restoration of respondent's license and seeks an order in harmony with appellant's prior order of revocation. Respondent would have
this court affirm the lower court's decision.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 22,1973, at approximately 10200 South
State Street at approximately 12:45 o'clock a.m., Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Arlo Wilkinson, stopped and
arrested respondent, John Rolfe Gassman (R. 23, 24).
Prior to the arost,, the Trooper had respondent perform
some field agility tests, one of which he did fairly well
and the others; Which the Trooper did not feel were satisfactory (R. 24, 25). Subsequent to the arrest, the
Trooper advised respondent of his constitutional rights
(all of V from Exhibit S-l), and also of his rights under
the Implied Consent law by reading to him all of VI
from Exhibit S-l which contained the information from
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended (R.
25, 26). The Trooper testified that he thereafter asked,
"Mr. Gassman, what is your response to my request that
you submit to a dhemical test?" and his response was
in these words: "Yes, I will take a blood test. Also I
want my physician to be there." Thereafter, the trooper
called the dispatcher while yet in the patrol vehicle and
finding the name of respondent's physician to be LaVere
Poulsen at the Granger Clinic discovered that he was
not on call but that Dr. Foulsen's brother,, Jerry Poulsen,
was (R. 27). On discovering this fact, Mr. Gassman
refused the use of Dr. Jerry Poulsen, saying "No way
do I want him to take my blood" (R. 27, 37). Prior to
this time the Trooper had made it clear to the respondent that his physician could take a test in addition (emphasis ours) to the one that the trooper requested him
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to take (R. 36, lines 9 and 10). Respondent and the
trooper proceeded to jail. At the jail the trooper advised
the respondent that he would try to call Dr. Paulsen's
answering service to see what response could be obtained,
and discovered from a Mrs. Beverly Simpson that "he
(meaning Dr. LaVere Poulsen) is not available. I don't
even know where he is at. I cannot locate him." The
trooper hung up from calling the Granger Clinic and
advised Mr. Gassman that they could not locate his doctor (R. 29). Upon being advised again that Dr. Poulsen's
brother Jerry was available, Mr. Gassman, the respondent, said "No way do I want Jerry." The respondent
did not further attempt to get hold of Dr. LaVere Pfoulsen saying that if the officer could not reach him certainly
the respondent could not (R. 30).
Thereafter, the trooper said to respondent, "Let's
forget a blood test for a moment. He(re is the breathalyzer in the other room. Will you come in and take the
breath test?" To this the respondent said, "No I will
not. No, no." Subsequent to that, the trooper said,
"Okay," and thereafter shoddy left the jail (R. 30, 37,
38). The respondent verified that he had been asked
to take a breathalyzer (R. 45), and further that he understood that Trooper Wilkinson would be administering
it (R. 45). Respondent further verified that the trooper
was at the jail sometime, probably a half hour (R. 45,
lines 12 and 13). The respondent expressed on direct
testimony from his attorney, Mr. Blackham, that he
thought Trooper Wilinkson was not an impartial witness
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to administer the breath test (R. 45, 46). The respondent acknowledged, however, under cross-examination
that he knew a number of doctors in the community (R.
46). The respondent further acknowledged that there
was not any particular reason when Dr. LaVere Poulsen
was unavailable that he did not designate some other
doctor, and did admit that he did not suggest any other
physician when he refused to let Dr. Jerry Foulsem,, the
brother, be contacted (R. 46, 47).
The respondent further acknowledged that he was
read the entire Implied Consent Law and that he had
never previously taken a breathalyzer test. Trooper Wilkinson took approximately 15 mintues or more attempting
to contact Dr. LaVere Poulsen and estimated that he
lelt the jail at approximately 2:15 o'clock a.m. as he
arrived at home at 3:00 o'clock a.m. (R. 30). The testimony was unrebutted that Trooper Wilkinson told the
respondent ait the jail that he could lose his license for
a year if he did not take either the breath or the blood
test (R. 31, 32, 38). The normal time for Trooper Wilkinson to be off shift that particular day was 1:00 o'clock
a.m. (R. 32).
At no time did the respondent request to call an
attorney. A phone was made available and was available
during the entire time they were in the jail (R. 31). At
no time subsequent to leaving the jail did Trooper Wilkinson receive a call to return (R. 32).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court found that the last advice given by the
trooper from his form (S-2) before asking him whether
he would submit was as follows: "You will be permitted
to have a physician of your own choice administer a
chemical test in addition to the one I have requested
you to submit to." To that the court said, "I can see
how somebody could see that that's a right and you
have the right to wait for that, unless it's further explained, and as such if he is not given that right, I can
see how he could rationalize'' (R. 48).
Thereafter, the court found that it was not a refusal
on the part of the respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL
COURT AND ORDER ARE NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE.
According to the record, Trooper Wilkinson arrested
the respondent on probable cause for driving under the
influence of alcohol. The record further contains invitations from Trooper Wilkinson to take and submit to a
chemical test on three occasions. The first, at the scene
to which the respondent indicated he would take a blood
test. The second and third requests were at the jai when
the toooper asked him to take again the blood test and
he indicated he wanted his doctor present.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The third request was to take a breathalyzer test
after both the trooper and the respondent were aware
that his personal physician was not on call and unavailable to come, and that his personal physician's brother,
a person in the same clinic was unacceptable to respondent as qualifying as his physician, for reasons personal
to the respondent only. The respondent did not further
denote any other physician which he would call or which
he requested the trooper to call. The respondent did not
evidence any confusion as to his rights. The only thing
that occurred at trial was the expression of respondent
that he did not feel that the trooper was an impartial
witness and therefore gave that as his reason why he
would not take the breathalyzer test, which was the
third offer made by the Trooper. There is no dispute in
the facts or evidence that he did refuse to take a breathalyzer test at the jail at approximately 2:15 o'clock a.m.
at a time just prior to Trooper Wilkinson leaving the
jail.
The Court found that there was not a refusal. The
evidence does not support this finding.
The question has been long settled that when the
officer requests a chemical test and the driver responds
with "no" that that is a refusal. Commonwealth v. Cheek,
451 S. W. 2d 394 (Ky. 1970). Maxted v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 14 Cal. App. 3d 982, 92 Cal. Rptr. 579
(1971). Should a person in respondent's position say
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
"I am not taking a test/' that has likewise been ruled as
a refusal. Sidler v. Strelecki, 98 N. J. Super. 530, 237 A.
2d 903 (1968).
Thee question is here raised, by implication from
the findings and order of the court below, that this driver
can somehow impose additional conditions or qualifications to his taking the chemical test. In the case before
us, however, the evidence is unequivocal that the respondent did agree to take a blood test, provided his own
physician was there, but unequivocally refused to take
a breath test when it was determined that his own physician was not available and a substitute physician standing
it was personally unacceptable to respondent. Therefore,
the above evidence does not support the finding of the
trial court.
It has been generally held that the person arrested
cannot impose conditions on his submission to a chemical
test. The Supreme Court of Virginia has said, "In Virginia, the consent to take a blood test is given when the
person operates a motor vehicle. It is not a qualified
consent and it is not a conditional consent, and therefore
there can be no qualified refusal or conditional refusal
to take a test." Deaner v. Commonwealtr, 210 Va. 285,
170 S. E. 2d 199 at 204 (1969).
In many cases a driver in respondent's position here
have tried to impose the requirement that the doctor
perform the test for the peace officer, or have his own
doctor present when the test was performed. These conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ditions placed by the driver have generally been held to
be a refusal. Westmoreland v. Chapman, 74 Cal. Rptr.
363 (Cal. App. 1968); Fattis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
70 Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. App. 1968); Beales v. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles, 76 Oai. Rptr. 662 (Cal. App. 1969);
Wegner v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 76 Cal. Rptr. 920 (Cal.
App. 1969); Cushman v. Tofany, 321 N. Y. S. 2d 831
(A. D. 1971); Breslin v. Hults, 248 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (A. D.
1964); Janson v. Fulton, 162 N. W. 2d 438 (Iowa 1968);
Shields v. Hults, 26 A. D. 2d 971, 274 N. Y. S. 2d 760
(1966); Sowa v. Hults, 22 A. D. 2d 730, 253 N. Y. S. 2d
294 (1964). The law in Utah is the same. When licensed
to drive, a driver has given his unqualified consent to a
chemical test. Drivers thereafter arrested under circumstances as here set forth have the choice to submit or
refuse, drawing the penalty of revocation.
It cannot be denied that the respondent did initially
consent to the taking of a sobriety test (R. 26); it is
clear that in specifying he would take a blood test if his
physician was there was a conditional agreement to submit to a test. There is no dispute further in the evidence
that that agreement carried forward in time to the jail
and reasonable efforts were made by Trooper Wilkinson
in response to said request to obtain his personal physician. Respondent was waiting to see if they could get Dr.
LaVere Poulsen and apparently the testimony is uncontroverted that Trooper Wilkinson was willing to wait
for Dr. LaVere Poulsen to come in order to have him
give a blood test to the respondent in addition to the one
that would be given pursuant to the request of the officer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When the trooper asked if the respondent would care
to try to get ahold of him, he responded, "If you can't
get him!, obviously I can't get ahold of him" (R. 30).
After that, Trooper Wilkinson said something to the
effect that they would forget about the blood test for
the moment and it was thereafter that the request was
made for the breathalyzer.
The testimony is unrebutted that the respondent
refused the breathalyzer test. The officer's testimony was
that the respondent said, "No I will not. No, no." The
trooper further testified (R. 31, line 10-13) that the respondent gave no qualification or reason to the officer
at that point in time as to why he would not take the
breath test, all he said was "no, no."
Therefore, other than respondent's testimony on direct to his counsel that he did not feel that the offijdar
was an impartial witness, there was no evidence that
would indicate that he was either confused or that there
was any qualification to the refusal to the breath test,
which was the third request by the trooper made of the
respondent. Therefore, this evidence does not support
the findings or the order of the lower court.
The last question as to whether the evidence supports the finding of the trial court is as relates to the
advice given to Mr. Gassman in relation to the Exhibit
£-2.
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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amended, sate forth at paragraph (g) the following language:
" (g) The person tested shall be permitted
to have a physician of his own choosing administer a cfoemiical test in addition to the one adimnistered at the direction of the peace officer/'
This subsection (g) does not give any parameters as
to whether said respondent has the right to have the
physician present at the time of the initial test or whether
it can be done at a time or place different
It is submitted by appellant that a fair reading of
paragraph (g) would indicate that a physician of respondent's choice could administer a test in addition
to either the breathalyzer or the blood test inasmuch
as the statute states "the one administered at the direction of the peace officer."
Further, paragraph (e) stipulates that on the request of the one tested, the respondent in the case here,
the results of the test shall be made available to the
respondent.
Paragraph (a) of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10
(1953), as amended, in the last sentence, states:
"The arresting officer shall determine within
reason which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered."
In the situation before the trial court, the evidence, again,
is unrebutted that the trooper had abandoned the blood
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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test and requested a breath test. This power to designate within reason is the prerogative by statute of the
peace officer, in this case, Trooper Wilkinson. Both parties to this matter, Trooper Wilkinson and respondent,
Mr. Gassman, were aware that his personal physician
was unavailable and therefore it was reasonable for the
trooper to ask him to take the alternate test, the breathalyzer. Mr. Gassman was clear that he assumed the
trooper was going to administer the test (R. 45). The
evidence is further unrebutted that an unequivocal "no"
was given by the respondent to the taking of such test
(R. 30, 37, 38).
The evidence is further unrebutted that respondent
was on notice that the availability of his own physician
to take an additional test was in addition (emphasis
ours) not in lieu of (emphasis ours) the test as required
under the statute (R. 36).
Appellant respectfully submits under the above facts
that the evidence adduced at trial do not support the
findings and order as set forth by the trial court.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE SOBRIETY
TEST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-644.10 (1953), AS AMENDED, WAS MADE
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR A
REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME AND
THE OFFICER CAN RESPOND WITH A
REFUSAL AFFIDAVIT WHERE WITHIN
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THAT LENGTH OF TIME HE REASONABLY CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS CHANGED HIS MIND FROM
A WILLINGNESS TO SUBMIT TO A TEST
TO AN UNWILLINGNESS TO DO SO.
The case at bar is somewhat the opposite of the
Hunter v. Dorius case, 23 Utah 2d 122, 456 P. 2d 877
(1969). In that case Dr. Hunter during a portion of
his time refused to take the test and then subsequently
changed his mind under carcumstances where this Honorable Oourt, concluded that it was within a reasonable
period of time and that the time period was such that
Dr. Hunter could change his mind.
In the case before the Court, it is a circumstance
where the respondent agreed to take the test and subsequently thereafter changed his mind and refused to
submit to an alternate test, to-wit, the breathalyzer.
Appellant submits that at that point in time the
officer was not, within the pfrerogative of his responsibilities, obligated to force a chemical test upon the respondent. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended,
subsection (c) provides in part:
"(c) If such person has been placed under
arrest and has thereafter been requested to submit to any one of the chemical tests provided
for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section and
refuses to submit to such chemical test, the test
shall not be given and the arresting officer shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shall advise the person of his rights under this
section." (Emphasis ours.)
The statute does not indicate that an officer in
Trooper Wilkinson's position is required only to offer
a single test, nor does the statute state that once a consent
to one test is given and the same cannot, for whatever
reason occurs, be administered, that a refusal to an alternate test would not thereafter be binding. The statute
merely states that if a person refuses, to any one of the
chemical tests (emphasis ours) the test shall not be
given. As in the Hunter case, if a person can change his
mind after he learns of the consequences of his action,
there being nothing in the statute precluding a person
from changing his mind and submitting to a test once
he has previously refused, the alternative is likewise true
that having said he would consent to a test, there is
nothing that precludes the respondent from changing his
mind and refusing a test as appellant alleges occurred
here.
The state and the individual have a valid interest
in objectively determining the level of alcohol in a driver's bloodstream. This true for the purposes of better
law enforcement and also in order to protect fully the
rights of arrested drivers. The state should make these
chemical tests available so that they might provide whatever probative value they reveal, equally beneficial to
the respondent in a case for exoneration, as also perhaps
could be utilized for implication.
The fact that respondent, after agreeing to a test
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and the conditions subsequent to that agreement being
unfulfilled, (that is, not being able to obtain his personal
physician), and thereafter unequivocally refusing the
breathalyzer test, it was the officer's duty to not so administer the test and to respect respondent's answer.
There is nothing in the statute that requires the officer
at that point without some affirmative action by respondent to obtain other physician or meet any conditions not
reasonable under the circumstances. The duty, if any,
was certainly upon the respondent to fulfill his conditions, imposed by himself, and agreed to by Trooper Wilkinson, to find alternative persons just as the duty would
be affirmatively upon the respondent in analogous circumstances to find an alternate attorney if the one he
had asked to consult was unavailable, and he and the
officer had taken reasonable time and efforts to obtain
his personal attorney to consult with, prior to taking
the test.
Appellant asserts that this court is aware that most
states hold that there is no right to consult an attorney
before submitting to a chemical test or having one present for the taking of a chemical test. That position is
modified within this jurisdiction by Hunter v. Dorius.
However, the Court did not state specifically under the
Hunter case that one in respondent's position, had an
absolute right to counsel, but expressed that it was the
law of this jurisdiction, under those ciixmmstances, that
were a person in respondent's position to request an
attorney and that request was asceded to by one in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trooper Wilkinson's position, that a reasonable effort
should be made and that when the officer did agree to
permit the contact of an attorney prior to the taking of
a test that was a right then existing by the arrested
drivecr. The Hunter case further states that thereafter
there should be a reasonable time in which to obtain
such an attorney and, a reasonable time after such contact within which the arrested driver could make up his
mind to take or to not submit to a chemical test.
By analogy, in the Hunter case, as it applies to the
statute and interprets the same, the same spirit of inteapretation would apply in the case at bar.
By analogy, the Hunter case, Hunter v. Dorius, 23
Utah 2d 122, should not be expanded imreasonably to
cover cases where the arrested party either cannot find
his physician or the arrest party voluntarily gives up
trying to contact a physician; or as in this case, contacts
his phyiscian's answering service, finds him unavailable,
also, his substitute an unacceptable (emphasis ours), but
suspends a decision he (emphasis ours) must necessarily
make, within a reasonable time, until he can see his
physician, which time may well be so far removed from
time of arrest as to invalidate any results then obtainable
by chemical test.
Specifically, appellant argues that when as provided
by the statute, and the advice given to the respondent
herein that he could have a physician of his own choice
administer a chemical test in addition to the one the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officer was requesting, and as here, the respondent wanted
a blood test, it follows that the peace officer should grant
the right for respondent to contact his personal physician and should grant a reasonable time for said personal
physician to locate himself at the place where the test
the officer has specified would be administered. In the
case before us, the respondent had specifically requested
a blood test, had asked that his physician administer it,
the respondent was advised clearly and the testimony
was unrebutted at trial that he could have his personal
physician administer the test but that it would be in
addition to, not instead of, a test requested by the officer, and one could only assume that he was agreeable
to a Wood test for Mr. Gassman.
It would further follow then that when it was apapparent that his personal physician was not available,
his substitute on duty was not agreeable to the respondent, Trooper Wilkinson could only conclude that the
taking of a blood test, absent any further request by Mr.
Gassman for some other physician, was not within reason
at that point in time. Therefore, the request of the
Trooper to take the breathalyzer was a reasonable request under the circumstances.
Respondent's unequivocal refusal to take a breathalyzer test without any renewal of his request for a physician or without a renewal of any other qiialiification
or stipulations could only be concluded by reasonable
men to be a refusal, by appellant herein denoted as a
direct refusal. See Maxsted, supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Also in that regard, the Lampman case, Lampman
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal. App. 3d 922,
105 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1973), sets forth even stricter interpretations in a California recent decision in addition to
the case of a flat no in the Maxsted case, and a case of
silence in the Lampman case. Both held refusals.
Further, the recent decision in McCall v. Dorius,
Utah 2d
, 527 P. 2d 647 (1974), makes it clear
that in the case at bar, as it was in the McCall case,
where there was no confusion, and the respondent, Mr.
Gassman, refused to take the test, and he understood
the consequences of loss of driver's license as a result
thereof, and there was no stated confusion on his part
at all except for the comment that he thought the Trooper
was not an impartial witness, a loss of license would
occur.
CONCLUSION
It is appellant's position that the findings and order
of the trial court were not justified by the evidence at
trial. It is further appellant's position that the officer
acted reasonably in all respects and that the respondent
was not confused and that he had the affirmative duty,
in not being able to obtain his own physician, to either
obtain an alternate physician or in the alternative to
agree to take the breathalyzer test or suffer the consequence of loss of license for the failure to take either
of the two tests at that point in time, and that the respondent's failure to take the test alter an arrest upon
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probable cause, and proper advice of rights, without any
explanation or further conditions, left the affirmative
duty with Trooper Wilkinson, upon a direct refusal, of
not administering the test and advising him of his rights.
All of the above which was accomplished, therefore the
trial court erred in reversing the administrative revocation, and the case should be reversed and remanded for
the trial court to be instructed to revoke plaintiff's driver's license as required by law for the period of one year.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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